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THE PRECARIOUS POSITION OF SAME-SEX
DIVORCE IN TEXAS
By: Shawna M. Young
ABSTRACT
Currently, same-sex couples that are legally married in a jurisdiction that
recognizes same-sex marriage may not be able to divorce if they move to
Texas. Of the few cases tried in Texas, most courts refused to grant the same-
sex divorce because the courts refused to recognize the underlying marriage.
Because these couples cannot simply return to the granting state due to most
states’ divorce residency requirements, they cannot divorce and face untold
issues due to this inability. While Texas does offer the opportunity for the
couple to declare the marriage void, declaring the marriage void is not an
adequate legal remedy and may not prevent property and other legal issues.
Instead, Texas should analyze divorce as implicating rights separate from
those implicated by marriage. Based on such analysis, Texas should grant
same-sex divorces.
While several authors have addressed this issue from a national standpoint,
this Comment addresses the issue as it stands in Texas, where a jurisdictional
split between the courts of appeals makes it ripe for discussion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Like marriage, divorce is an option most people take for granted.
But not everyone can marry the person they love, and once married,
not everyone can divorce the person they once loved. As the debate
rages over whether same-sex marriage should be recognized, a mini-
debate is raging over whether states that do not recognize same-sex
marriage should at least grant same-sex couples’ divorces.
As of this Comment, thirteen states and the District of Columbia
recognize same-sex marriages.1 In those states that do not recognize
same-sex marriages, some courts have held that refusing to recognize
out-of-state, same-sex marriages includes refusing to grant divorces to
those couples who are otherwise validly married.2 According to these
courts, granting divorces to same-sex couples means recognizing the
underlying marriage in contravention of their states’ laws.3
However, there are serious ramifications if courts refuse to recog-
nize valid, out-of-state same-sex marriages in order to grant divorces.
If a legally married, same-sex couple moves to a state that refuses to
divorce them, the couple may be unable to obtain a divorce alto-
gether. Most married couples cannot simply return to the state that
granted their marriage to divorce because all but four states have di-
vorce residency requirements that preclude divorce for couples no
longer residing in the state.4 Precluded from divorcing in their new
1. Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/
same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated Jun. 26, 2013).
2. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007); Kern v. Taney,
11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 576 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 2010); Rosengarten v. Downes,
802 A.2d 170, 172 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
3. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007); Kern v. Taney,
11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 576 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 2010); Rosengarten v. Downes,
802 A.2d 170, 172 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
4. As of the date of this Article, Alaska, Louisiana, South Dakota, and Washing-
ton do not have divorce residency requirements. Grounds for Divorce and Residency
Requirements, ABA SEC. FAMILY LAW (Winter 2013), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/family_law/resources/family_law_in_the_50_states.html; see
also Colleen McNichols Ramais, ’Til Death Do You Part . . . and This Time We Mean
It: Denial of Access to Divorce for Same-Sex Couples,  2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1015
(2010) (citing HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATEs 703 (2d ed. 1987)).
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state of residency and precluded from returning to the granting state
just to divorce, these couples may find themselves in the untenable
position of having no method of terminating their legal relationship.5
This Comment focuses on the situation in Texas for same-sex
couples seeking a divorce. Part II explains the legal landscape in Texas
for same-sex marriages and divorces. Part III addresses whether
granting a divorce means recognizing the underlying marriage. Part
IV discusses the constitutional analysis of denying divorce to same-sex
couples and discusses some of the state interests Texas has suggested
as justification for denying same-sex divorces. Part V discusses the in-
adequacy of declaring same-sex marriages void. Part VI suggests the
scales are weighted toward Texas courts granting same-sex divorces.
II. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN TEXAS
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Texas is ranked fourth in
number of same-sex couples.6 Even so, Texas does not recognize
same-sex marriages, even if the marriage is valid in other jurisdic-
tions.7 Whether Texas grants same-sex divorces is less settled.8
A. Texas Laws Regarding Same-Sex Marriage
In 2003, the Texas Legislature passed a bill prohibiting same-sex
marriage that became section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code.9 The
statute states in part:
(b) A marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union is
contrary to the public policy of this state and is void in this state. (c)
The state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may not
give effect to a: (1) public act, record, or judicial proceeding that
creates, recognizes, or validates a marriage between persons of the
same sex or a civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction; or
(2) right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility
asserted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex
or a civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction.10
The statute is nestled among other sections in the Family Code that
prohibit marriages that are against public policy, such as marrying
5. Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2
(2012).
6. Same-Sex Couple Households: 2011 American Community Survey, UNITED
STATES CENSUS BUREAU (2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ssex-tables
-2011.xls.
7. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32.
8. See, e.g., State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet.
filed); In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet.
filed).
9. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (West 2012).
10. § 6.204(b)–(c).
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close relatives, marrying a minor under sixteen, and marrying a
stepchild or stepparent.11
When introduced, the bill included a section clearly stating that re-
fusing to recognize same-sex marriage did not infringe on the rights of
people in same-sex relationships because same-sex couples had other
means of protecting those rights.12
In 2005, the Texas Legislature went further and amended the Texas
Constitution to add a section limiting marriage to a man and a wo-
man.13 According to the amendment, “Marriage in this state shall con-
sist only of the union of one man and one woman. . . . This state or a
political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal
status identical or similar to marriage.”14
The analysis of the amendment stated that the amendment was be-
ing introduced so that the public would vote on the issue of same-sex
marriage instead of the court system extending marriage to same-sex
couples.15 Like the analysis for the statute, the analysis for the consti-
tutional amendment included a disclaimer stating that same-sex
couples could protect the rights marriage would protect through other
legal means.16 As of this Comment, the Texas Supreme Court has not
decided any cases involving the amendment.
B. The Jurisdictional Split in Texas Courts of Appeals
Regarding Same-Sex Divorce
Though Texas law obviously prohibits same-sex marriage, Texas
courts are still struggling with whether granting divorces to same-sex
couples violates the Texas mini-DOMA law interred in the Texas Con-
stitution, Article I, Section 32, and the related Family Code Section
6.204 that voids same-sex marriage and declares such marriages con-
trary to public policy. Two recent Texas Courts of Appeals cases, State
v. Naylor and In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., showcase this
struggle.17
11. §§ 6.201–06.
12. Senate Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 7, 78th Leg., R.S.
(2003) (“[T]he legislature finds that through the designation of guardians, the ap-
pointment of agents, and the use of private contracts, persons may adequately and
properly appoint guardians and arrange rights relating to hospital visitation, property,
and the entitlement to proceeds of life insurance policies without the existence of any
legally recognized familial relationship between the persons.”).
13. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32.
14. Id.
15. TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS 19 (2005), available at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/Constitu-
tional_Amendments/amendments79_tlc_2005-11-08.pdf.
16. Id. at 22.
17. See State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. filed);
In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. filed).
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The first case is State v. Naylor, decided by the Third Court of Ap-
peals.18 There, the trial court granted a divorce between two Texas
residents who had traveled to Massachusetts in 2004 to be married.19
The State of Texas attempted to intervene in the case, but the trial
court held that the State’s intervention was not timely and refused to
allow the State to intervene.20 The State appealed, and the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.21 While the court avoided
reaching the merits of the case, the court did note that the trial court
could have reasonably interpreted Texas law to allow it to grant the
divorce.22
The second case is In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., decided by the
Fifth Court of Appeals.23 There, both parties were residents of Massa-
chusetts when they married.24 After moving to Texas, J.B. filed a di-
vorce petition.25 Once again, the State of Texas attempted to
intervene.26 The trial court ruled that the State did not have standing
to intervene in the case, and the court granted the divorce, holding
that section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code was unconstitutional.27
The Fifth Court of Appeals granted the State’s intervention and over-
turned the trial court’s decision, holding that Texas courts do not have
subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate same-sex divorce petitions.28
The court also held that section 6.204 was constitutionally valid and
did not violate the Equal Protection clause.29 A petition for review
has been filed with the Texas Supreme Court.30
III. RECOGNIZING THE UNDERLYING MARRIAGE
At first blush, the contention that a Texas court should not grant a
divorce for a marriage it would not otherwise recognize seems reason-
able. After all, marriage is a necessary precedent condition for di-
vorce. In fact, more than one court has followed this logic and refused
to issue a divorce decree.31 For example, in Mireles v. Mireles, the First
18. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at 436.
19. Id. at 441.
20. Id. at 438.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 442 (quoting City of Houston v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 314, 320 (Tex. 2006)).
23. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 654 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010,
pet. filed).
24. Id. at 659.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 660.
28. Id. at 659.
29. Id. at 681.
30. Case Information, TEX. CTS. ONLINE, http://www.search.txcourts.gov/
Case.aspx?cn=11-0024 (last visited Jul. 24, 2013).
31. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 666; Mireles v. Mireles, No. 01-
08-00499-CV, 2009 WL 884815 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st] Apr. 2, 2009) (mem. op.);
Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 576 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 2010); but see In
re Estate of Dalip Singh Bir, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (“recognizing” polyga-
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Court of Appeals voided a divorce decree that had been issued for a
Texas marriage between a female and a transgendered male.32 Ac-
cording to the court, “A Texas court has no more power to issue a
divorce decree for a same-sex marriage than it does to administer the
estate of a living person.”33
Likewise, the Fifth Court of Appeals quoted Mireles in In re Mar-
riage of J.B. and used the same reasoning to hold that Texas courts did
not have jurisdiction to grant divorces in same-sex marriages.34 The
court extended the holding in Mireles, which was a marriage granted
in Texas and presumably invalid in all jurisdictions from the outset, to
valid marriages granted outside of Texas.
While the analysis might change if the marriage occurred in a non-
recognizing state, courts can grant divorces without defying their
state’s mini-DOMA laws. Recognizing a marriage and granting a di-
vorce are not synonymous.35 Recognizing an out-of-jurisdiction mar-
riage in the fashion precluded by Texas law means conferring in-state
marital status on a couple, with attendant rights and obligations. It
does not mean “acknowledging” the marriage temporarily in order to
remove a status granted outside the jurisdiction.36 Any right or obliga-
tion conferred via divorce relates only to the orderly dissolution of a
legal relationship and to marriage. As the United States Supreme
Court noted in Boddie v. Connecticut, marriage is a relationship and
divorce is the means to dissolve a relationship.37
The Wyoming Supreme Court followed this line of reasoning in
Christiansen v. Christiansen when the court addressed whether Wyo-
ming district courts could grant same-sex divorces.38 Like Texas, Wyo-
ming does not recognize same-sex marriage and defines marriage as
only between a man and a woman.39 In Christiansen, a same-sex
couple, validly married in Canada, appealed a district court ruling that
held Wyoming courts did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant
same-sex divorces.40 In light of Wyoming’s law limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples, the district court determined there was no mar-
riage to dissolve.41
mous marriage for intestate property division); Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142
(Miss. 1948) (“recognizing” interracial marriage for intestate property division).
32. Mireles, 2009 WL 884815, at *2.
33. Id. (quoting in part Templeton v. Ferguson, 33 S.W. 329, 332 (Tex.1895)).
34. In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 666.
35. Divorce and marriage are also separate rights. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
36. For an excellent discussion of the “incidents of marriage” approach, see Bar-
bara Cox’s article Using An “Incidents Of Marriage” Analysis When Considering In-
terstate Recognition Of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, And Domestic
Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699 (2004).
37. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
38. Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 154 (Wyo. 2011).
39. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (West 2012).
40. Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 154.
41. Id. at 155.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court overturned the decision and held
Wyoming’s law did not apply to divorce proceedings because “[a] di-
vorce proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an
ongoing relationship.”42 The Court also noted that “recognizing a
valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of entertain-
ing a divorce proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in Wyoming
against allowing the creation of same-sex marriages.”43
Wyoming’s decision is congruous with earlier cases in which courts
acknowledged marriages contrary to their state’s public policy for a
specific purpose other than granting marital status.44 In In re Dalip
Singh Bir’s Estate, a California court of appeals “recognized” a polyg-
amous marriage solely for intestate property division.45 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in In re Lenherr’s Estate, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Succession of Caballero, and the Mississippi Su-
preme Court in Miller v. Lucks all “recognized” marriages otherwise
void for intestate succession.46 More recently, an Iowa trial court in In
re Marriage of Brown dissolved a Vermont civil union between two
women—then unrecognized by Iowa—based in equity.47
Like these other states, Texas courts can “recognize” a same-sex
marriage in a narrow fashion and for the sole purpose of granting a
divorce without impermissibly recognizing the marriage in order to
confer marital status to a same-sex couple.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DENYING DIVORCE FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES
Many courts have analyzed the constitutionality of denying same-
sex divorce by analyzing the constitutionality of their state’s law deny-
ing same-sex marriage.48 This may be an extension of the belief that a
court cannot grant a divorce when it cannot recognize the underlying
marriage. However, this analysis is flawed. Analyzing the constitution-
ality of denying same-sex marriage is not analogous to analyzing the
42. Id. at 156.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. BEALE, 2 A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 666
(1935); Ortley v. Ross, 110 N.W. 982, 983 (Neb. 1907) (recognizing polygamous mar-
riage); Rogers v. Cordingley, 4 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn. 1942) (recognizing polyga-
mous marriage); Mayse v. Newman, 118 P.2d 398, 400 (Okla. 1941) (recognizing
polygamous marriage); In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953) (recognizing
incestuous marriage).
45. In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 262 (1948).
46. In re Lenherr’s Estate, 314 A.2d 255, 259 (Pa. 1974); Succession of Caballero,
24 La. Ann. 573, 578 (1872); Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948).
47. In re Marriage of Brown, Equity No. CDCD 119660 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Nov. 14,
2003), appeal dismissed for lack of standing sub nom. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court for
Woodbury Cnty., 698 N.W.2d 858, 874 (Iowa 2005).
48. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn. App. 372, 388–92 (2002); Kern v.
Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 568–70 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 2010); In re Marriage
of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 675 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. filed).
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constitutionality of denying same-sex divorce because divorce and
marriage implicate different individual rights.
A. Marriage and Divorce Implicate Different Rights
Though the right to marry does not (yet) include same-sex mar-
riage,49 the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared marriage a funda-
mental right.50 Marriage implicates the right of privacy and is a “vital
personal right[ ] essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness . . . .”51
In contrast, divorce implicates the right to access the courts under
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.52 The Supreme
Court made this clear in Boddie v. Connecticut.53 In Boddie, the plain-
tiff, who was indigent, sued Connecticut because the state would not
start her divorce action unless she paid the filing fee.54 Instead of de-
claring divorce an individual right, the Court declared Connecticut’s
policy unconstitutional as a restriction on access to the courts.55 The
Court opined that divorcing couples cannot obtain relief through any
other means than the state’s judicial system.56 Because of this monop-
oly, divorcing couples are similar to defendants who are “compelled to
litigate their differences in the judicial forum” and are covered by the
same due process protections.57 The Court applied strict scrutiny re-
view and held that a state may not “pre-empt the right to dissolve
[marriages] without affording all citizens access to the means it has
prescribed for doing so.”58
The Court did not analyze the plaintiff’s rights in obtaining a di-
vorce in Boddie the same way it analyzed the plaintiffs’ rights to
49. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (Justice O’Connor, concurring).
50. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
51. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
52. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (“[D]ue process does prohibit
a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individ-
uals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.”); see also Meg Penrose, Un-
breakable Vows: Same-Sex Marriage and the Fundamental Right to Divorce, 58 VILL.
L. REV. 169, 202–04 (2013).
53. L. Lynn Hogue, The Constitutional Obligation to Adjudicate Petitions for
Same-Sex Divorce and the Dissolution of Civil Unions and Analogous Same-Sex Rela-
tionships: Prolegomenon to a Brief, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 229, 238 (2010); see also
Ramais, supra note 4, at 1033–34; Mary P. Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Same-Sex
Divorce in a DOMA State, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 214, 215 (2012).
54. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 372.
55. Id. at 382–83.
56. Id. at 376 (“Even where all substantive requirements are concededly met, we
know of no instance where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate
themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and more
fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the State’s judi-
cial machinery.”)
57. Id. at 377.
58. Id. at 383.
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marry in Loving v. Virginia and Zablocki v. Redhail.59 The Court ana-
lyzed the plaintiff’s right to divorce in Boddie as the due process right
to a meaningful opportunity to be heard.60 In contrast, the Court ana-
lyzed the plaintiffs’ right to marry in Loving and Zablocki as a funda-
mental, personal right.61 By its analysis, the Court distinguished the
two rights by distinguishing the animating Constitutional authority be-
hind them.62
If same-sex couples are prohibited from divorcing in Texas courts,
their situation is strikingly similar to the plaintiff’s situation in Boddie
because they would be unable to obtain relief through any other
means.63 Contrary to Texas’ argument, declaring the marriage void
does not offer adequate, meaningful relief to same-sex couples.64
Thus, like the plaintiff in Boddie, same-sex couples would be trapped
in legal relationships they cannot dissolve because states have a mo-
nopoly on granting divorces to their citizens. Unlike residency re-
quirements, which the Supreme Court upheld,65 Texas’ complete
denial of divorce falls afoul of the holding in Boddie.66 Like Connecti-
cut’s policy in Boddie, Texas’ policy of denying some citizens access to
the means of obtaining divorces would likely be subjected to strict
scrutiny review if before the Supreme Court. Texas’ policy would most
certainly fail strict scrutiny review; arguably, Texas’ policy would not
even survive rational basis review.
B. Courts Questioning Constitutionality in Cases About Same-Sex
Divorce Should Analyze Divorce—Not Marriage
Courts questioning the constitutionality of denying same-sex di-
vorce should analyze whether denying divorce is constitutionally sus-
pect, not whether denying same-sex marriage is constitutionally
suspect. However, most courts’ analysis, if not all, is flawed because it
has been the latter and not the former.67 As mentioned above, divorce
and marriage are separate rights and should be analyzed separately,
and the appropriate question courts should be asking is whether deny-
ing divorce violates the Constitution.68
59. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967); see also Hogue, supra note 53, at 239.
60. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377.
61. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
62. Hogue, supra note 53, at 239.
63. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 37, In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326
S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. filed) (No. 11-0024), 2011 WL 8584393 at
*37; see also Hogue, supra note 53, at 239.
64. See discussion infra Part V.
65. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
66. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971).
67. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn. App. 372, 388–92 (2002); Kern v.
Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 568–70 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 2010); In re Marriage
of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 675.
68. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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The Fifth Court of Appeals improperly analyzed marriage and not
divorce in In re Marriage of J.B. when the court addressed an equal
protection attack on section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code.69 The
court decided strict scrutiny did not apply because homosexuals were
not a suspect class and because same-sex marriage was not a funda-
mental right.70
The court then analyzed section 6.204 to determine if the law served
a legitimate purpose under rational basis review.71 After concluding
Texas might have a rational basis to conclude that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex partners furthered an “optimal” setting for child-rearing,
the court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.72 Nowhere in its opinion did the court analyze whether deny-
ing same-sex divorce bore a rational relation to a legitimate state in-
terest.73 Had the court analyzed whether section 6.204 was
unconstitutional as applied to same-sex divorce, the court most likely
would have come to a different conclusion.
C. Denying Same-Sex Divorce Probably Violates the Constitution
Considering the Supreme Court’s precedent in Boddie, laws com-
pletely precluding citizens from divorcing would probably be subject
to strict scrutiny review.74 In the Court’s own words, a state must have
“a countervailing state interest of overriding significance” when it de-
nies its citizens “the sole means . . . for obtaining a divorce.”75 Thus, if
Texas courts interpret section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code to deny
divorce to same-sex couples, then the law would most likely be subject
to strict scrutiny review. Like Connecticut, Texas would be violating
the due process requirement of an opportunity to be heard by denying
divorce to some of its citizens, and like Connecticut’s law, Texas’ law
would be overturned unless Texas could produce a state interest of
overriding significance. However, Texas has not produced such an in-
terest and arguably cannot. In fact, Texas likely would be unable to
produce a legitimate interest to defend section 6.204 under even the
lenient standard of rational and basis review because denying divorce
serves no legitimate state interest.76
Courts in Texas have not addressed whether Texas has any legiti-
mate interest in denying same-sex couples divorce because courts
69. In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 675.
70. Note that the court did not consider whether divorce was a fundamental right
though there is a very good argument it is in light of Boddie. See discussion supra Part
IV.A.
71. In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 676–78.
72. Id. at 677.
73. Id.
74. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
75. Id.
76. See N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
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have conducted their analyses on marriage and not divorce.77 Neither
has the State argued that it has a legitimate interest in denying divorce
to same-sex couples because courts have not distinguished divorce
from marriage.78 In the context of denying same-sex marriage, though,
Texas has proposed legitimate interests in encouraging responsible
procreation,79 protecting tradition,80 and promoting morality.81 Courts
have analyzed these interests as related to marriage, and the State has
persuaded most courts that (1) these interests are valid and (2) deny-
ing same-sex marriage furthers these interests.82
As to the validity of these interests, courts nation-wide are divided
over whether such interests sanction laws that discriminate against
homosexuals.83 In the context of other rights, courts have found no
relation between such state interests and denying same-sex couples
health benefits,84 joint bankruptcy petitions,85 or adoption.86 Likewise,
it would be unlikely that a court would uphold a law that denies same-
sex couples divorce based on these interests.
1. Encouraging Responsible Procreation
Encouraging responsible procreation is one of Texas’s primary as-
serted legitimate state interests in prohibiting same-sex marriage.87
Abbreviated, Texas’ argument is that the State should encourage
couples that can “naturally” procreate to get married.88 While Texas
allows adoption, in vitro fertilization, and surrogate parenting, “natu-
ral” reproduction (apparently defined as the result of heterosexual in-
tercourse) is something only opposite-sex couples can do without
outside help.89 Children, as a “natural” result of opposite-sex relation-
ships, do better in stable households with opposite-sex parents.90 Mar-
77. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
78. Id.
79. Brief of the State of Texas at 17–20, In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d
654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. filed) (No. 05-09-01170-CV), 2010 WL 1367402, at
*17–*20.
80. Id. at 12–17.
81. Respondent’s Brief at 41, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003).
82. See, e.g., State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet.
filed); In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 654.
83. Compare Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), and Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at
434, with Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006), and In re
Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 654.
84. Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010).
85. In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
86. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81, 91
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); see also Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procrea-
tion: A Genealogy of an Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 781, 841–46 (2012).
87. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d at 677–78.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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riages produce more stable homes, and therefore Texas should
encourage opposite-sex couples to marry.91
Opponents of same-sex marriage have awkwardly stretched the
State’s legitimate interest in encouraging responsible procreation into
a justification for denying same-sex marriage, but it seems incompre-
hensible how this interest could be used as justification to deny same-
sex divorce. Refusing to grant divorces to same-sex couples simply
does not further the potentially legitimate state interest of encourag-
ing responsible procreation. Divorce is unrelated to procreation be-
cause couples do not divorce each other in order to procreate with
each other. Removing marital status from a same-sex couple does not
interfere with encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry. In fact, re-
fusing to grant same-sex couples divorces could deter the State’s ver-
sion of responsible procreation. Because some people in same-sex
relationships enter opposite-sex relationships when their relationship
ends, denying divorce prevents those people from ending their legal
marriage (albeit from another state), remarrying, and having children.
Refusing to grant a divorce decreases the likelihood more children
would be raised in an opposite-sex household.
Most importantly, removing a marital status Texas refuses to recog-
nize anyway is not related to protecting children. Instead, children of
the relationship face hardship when their parents are not protected by
the legal means of divorce.92
2. Tradition
Having asserted it in relation to denying same-sex marriage, protect-
ing tradition is another interest Texas might assert to defend denying
divorce to same-sex couples.93 States, though, have used the interest
of tradition to justify slavery,94 gender discrimination,95 and racial dis-
crimination,96 and as a state interest, protecting tradition should be
viewed suspiciously when used by states to justify discriminatory
laws.97 Furthermore, claiming that a law furthers the legitimate inter-
est of upholding tradition is an illogical response to an Equal Protec-
tion challenge because Equal Protection protects minorities, but
91. Id.
92. See discussion infra Part V.B.
93. See, e.g., Brief of the State of Texas, supra note 79, at 30; Respondent’s Brief,
supra note 81, at 9–18.
94. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416 (1856); see also Kim Forde-
Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 281, 326–27 (2011).
95. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1908); see also Forde-Mazrui,
supra note 94, at 327.
96. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 94, at 326–27.
97. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 94, at 322.
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tradition is defined by the majority.98 Most importantly, the Supreme
Court found protecting tradition unpersuasive as a legitimate state in-
terest when the State of Texas used tradition to justify discriminatory
measures against homosexuals.99 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held
a history and tradition of censure toward homosexuals was not a suffi-
cient reason to uphold a law under rational basis review.100
Logically, protecting tradition is spurious when used to justify a ban
on divorce. Tradition does serve some legitimate purpose in society,
such as maintaining predictability and stability, promoting a shared
identity, and avoiding the unforeseen consequences of change, but
granting divorces to same-sex couples does not frustrate any of these
legitimate ends.101 Instead, denying same-sex couples the right to di-
vorce undermines predictability and stability because it denies the
couple a definitive end to their relationship.102 Texas’ jurisdictional
split is a clear example of such a result.103 Denying same-sex couples
the right to divorce does not promote a shared identity, aside from
perhaps an identity of disfavoring homosexuals, and this is impermis-
sible prejudice as seen in Lawrence and Romer.104 Denying same-sex
couples the right to divorce does not avoid unforeseen consequences
of change. Allowing same-sex divorces introduces almost no change
into the legal system or into society as there are no greater imposi-
tions on either to declare a marriage void than to grant a divorce de-
cree. Instead, there might be unforeseen consequences from refusing
to grant a divorce because such refusal leaves same-sex couples in le-
gal limbo—the consequences of which are yet to be fully determined.
3. Promoting Morality and Expressing Disapproval
Texas might claim a legitimate interest in promoting residents’ sex-
ual mores or expressive concerns, as it did in Lawrence.105 However,
promoting morality (and similarly, indicating moral disapproval) may
not have survived as a legitimate state interest.106 Of all states, Texas
should know this best because it was a party in a case where the Su-
preme Court made it abundantly clear that moral disapproval, stand-
ing alone, is not a legitimate state interest and does not withstand
98. Id. at 297 (citing Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177,
205 (1993)).
99. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 81, at 41.
100. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
101. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 94, at 293.
102. See discussion infra Part V.B.
103. Compare State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet.
filed), with In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2010, pet. filed).
104. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
105. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 81, at 42–48.
106. Hogue, supra note 53, at 235.
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rational basis review.107 In Lawrence, Texas attempted to defend a law
criminalizing homosexual sodomy by claiming it furthered the legiti-
mate state interest of promoting morality.108 The Court promptly
struck down this argument by holding that “[m]oral disapproval of a
group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal
Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”109
States also cannot legislate animus.110 In Romer v. Evans, the Su-
preme Court—using rational basis review—struck down a Colorado
law invalidating any law that prohibited anti-gay discrimination.111
The Court said that the law was not rationally related to any legitimate
state purpose and therefore the law was inferentially based in animos-
ity toward homosexuals.112 Quoting Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, the Court said that “a bare desire to harm a politically un-
popular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”113
Taken together, Lawrence and Romer proscribe Texas from claim-
ing any state interest based on moral disapproval or animosity toward
homosexuals. But even if promoting a certain view of morality were a
legitimate state interest, it is far too attenuated from denying divorce
to same-sex couples to be a rational basis for such denial. Divorce
dissolves a status and does not create one. Therefore, the State is not
sanctioning a certain type of relationship by granting a divorce; it is
merely putting the couple in the same position as other homosexual
citizens of the state. Neither does Texas legitimize or extend the right
to marry to same-sex couples by granting divorces to them because
divorce is based on a right (access to the courts) other than the right
to marry.114 Granting a divorce does not implicate any right to marry.
The marriage has already happened, and now the parties are seeking
an opportunity to be heard.
V. DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID
In In re Marriage of J.B., Texas argued that J.B. and H.B. had the
option to bring a suit to declare their marriage void and that option
offered them relief significantly similar to relief obtained through di-
vorce.115 But a suit to declare a marriage void is not a divorce by an-
other name. A suit to declare a marriage void is an inadequate
107. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 633 (1996)).
108. Id. at 582.
109. Id. at 583 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
110. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
111. Id. at 635–36.
112. Id. at 634.
113. Id. at 633 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
114. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
115. Brief of the State of Texas, supra note 79, at 8–11.
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substitute for a divorce, and Texas does not provide an adequate legal
remedy for same-sex couples by providing them the opportunity to
declare their marriage void.
A. The State That Issued the Marriage License May Not Recognize
Texas’ Declaration That the Marriage Was Void
First of all, unlike divorce cases, there is little if any litigation re-
garding one state recognizing a declaration that a marriage is void
from another state.116 There are only a few situations that give rise to
void marriages, such as underage or incestuous marriages, and courts
generally uphold marriages void in their own state but valid in the
issuing state (same-sex marriages aside).117 Thus, while case law offers
precedent to extend full faith and credit to out-of-state divorces, there
is no precedent to extend full faith and credit to out-of-state actions
declaring a marriage void.118
In In re Marriage of J.B., Texas argued that a declaration that a
marriage was void would be recognized in other states, but the case
Texas cited was not analogous.119 In its brief, the State cited Sutton v.
Lieb as proof that annulments, at least, were recognized across state
lines.120 Sutton, however, is distinguishable from both State v. Naylor
and In re Marriage of J.B. because Sutton concerned a contested mar-
riage void both in the state granting the marriage and in the state
granting the annulment.121 In contrast, the marriages in State v. Naylor
and In re Marriage of J.B. were valid in the state granting them and
void only in Texas.122
In fact, Sutton was distinguished from another case—Linneman v.
Linneman—for this very reason.123 In Linneman, the Illinois Appel-
late Court specifically refused to follow Sutton (also originally an Illi-
nois case).124 The court held an annulment granted in California was
invalid because the annulment would not have been valid in Illinois,
the granting state.125 The court held that “unless the California decree
of annulment was granted on grounds that were recognized in Illinois
116. Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 73, 107–08 (2011).
117. See, e.g., Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Elder, 282 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1955); Hous.
Oil Co. v. Griggs, 181 S.W. 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 1915); Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 275
P. 987 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929); In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953); see also
Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 53, at 217.
118. Oppenheimer, supra note 116, at 106–08.
119. Brief of the State of Texas, supra note 79, at 9–10.
120. Id.
121. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 405–06 (1952); Linneman v. Linneman, 116
N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953).
122. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010,
pet. filed); State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. filed).
123. Linneman, 116 N.E.2d at 186.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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. . . it would not be binding on the defendant.”126 Therefore, even the
case Texas relied on in its brief offers no guarantee that other states
will extend to Texas the full faith and credit it has refused to extend to
their marriages.
Second, a state could justify ignoring Texas’ attempt to invalidate
the marriage because such an attempt likely violates the granting
state’s public policy. Just as Texas refuses to recognize same-sex mar-
riages because such recognition violates its public policy, the granting
state likely recognizes same-sex marriages due to state interests in
equal protection, anti-discrimination, and/or household stability.
Texas violates these policies when it declares a marriage granted in
such a state void.
More pragmatically, a state might refuse to recognize Texas’ decla-
ration that a marriage granted in its jurisdiction was void because do-
ing so could create havoc both for the couple and for any business that
relied on the couple’s married status. A void marriage is void ab ini-
tio.127 This means that all the actions the couple took in the granting
state based on their marital status are now called into question. Retro-
actively changing the couple’s status drastically alters the legal land-
scape of the couple’s mutual property and mutual obligations. When
dealing with opposite-sex couples, creditors may use joint assets in
community property states to satisfy joint obligations or may argue
the doctrine of necessaries to obligate spouses.128 But if the couple’s
marriage can be declared void overnight, creditors would not be able
to rely on either to satisfy debts.129 Furthermore, in community prop-
erty states, property attained as a couple would no longer be joint
property to be divided by court order because the marriage never ex-
isted.130 Granting states could very easily justify ignoring Texas’ decla-
ration that the marriage is void just to prevent such uncertainty.
B. Declaring the Marriage Void Is an Inadequate
Substitute for Divorce
Contrary to the State’s argument, a declaration that a marriage is
void is not commensurate with a divorce decree.131 Declaring a mar-
riage void is inferior to a divorce proceeding in many respects. First, a
suit to declare a marriage void does not protect property rights as well
as a divorce proceeding.132 Premarital agreements are generally en-
126. Id. at 184–85.
127. Simpson v. Neely, 221 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1949, writ
ref’d) (“A void marriage is one that is absolutely null, having no force or effect for
any purpose, at any place or time . . . .”).
128. Jill C. Rush, Unequal Treatment and Creditor Frustrations: The Limited Impact
of Legalizing Same Sex Marriage, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 743, 748 (2005).
129. Id. at 748–49.
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (West 2012).
131. Brief of the State of Texas, supra note 79, at 10.
132. Oppenheimer, supra note 116, at 107–08.
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forced in divorce proceedings, but premarital agreements are enforced
only in suits to declare a marriage void on equitable principles.133
Also, Texas is a community property state.134 According to section
3.003 of the Texas Family Code, property acquired during marriage
“by either spouse” is presumptively community property.135 Courts
would be unlikely to apply the community property presumption in a
case, such as a suit to declare a marriage void, in which the parties are
not “spouses” under Texas law.136 Instead, courts divide property such
that the parties only “own the property acquired in proportion to the
value of his labor contributed to the acquisition of it.”137 This puts the
divorcing parties at a disadvantage because property division then re-
quires proof of contribution, and proof of contribution may not lead
to equitable division. If one of the parties was the primary earner,
division by proof of contribution could be biased toward the income
earner, and proof of contribution can also be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, if the couple has been married for a long time.
Second, divorce adjudication protects a greater number of rights.138
Divorces—and not suits to declare a marriage void—provide the fol-
lowing protections: (1) a party is restricted from transferring commu-
nity property or incurring debt while a divorce action is pending; (2)
the court can order name changes if necessary; (3) the court deter-
mines how property should be divided; (4) the court can order mainte-
nance; and (5) the court enforces the parties’ agreements concerning
property division, liabilities, child custody, and maintenance.139
Third, a declaration that a marriage is void may provide no protec-
tion at all outside of the state that granted the declaration. The grant-
ing state may not recognize the declaration, and if so, the couple
remains legally married and could have serious problems.140 For ex-
ample, remarriage would be fraught with uncertainty because the
marrying party could face criminal charges for bigamy.141 Even if no
criminal charges were filed, subsequent marriages would be void be-
cause the marrying party was already married. As discussed above,
void marriages incur numerous problems with legal obligations and
property rights.142 In particular, a person could be unsuspectingly obli-
gated or be subjected to property claims by his or her estranged
spouse.143 An estranged spouse could also assert spousal inheritance
133. FAM. § 4.007.
134. See §§ 3.001–.008.
135. See, e.g., § 3.003.
136. § 6.204.
137. Hayworth v. Williams, 116 S.W. 43, 46 (Tex. 1909).
138. Oppenheimer, supra note 116, at 106–08.
139. 39 TEX. JUR. 3d, Family Law § 313 (2011).
140. See discussion supra Part V.A.
141. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
272, § 15 (West 2000).
142. See discussion supra Part V.B.
143. Rush, supra note 128, at 758–59.
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rights, trumping the wishes of the deceased and the needs of the de-
ceased’s current family.144 Couples seek a legal dissolution to avoid
these types of uncertainties, and declaring a marriage void does not
guarantee that relief.
Lastly, a declaration that the marriage was void stigmatizes the par-
ties to the marriage.145 Suits to declare marriages void imply the le-
gally valid marriage between the couple was neither legal nor valid
when it was effectuated. Texas law implies same-sex marriages are il-
licit because the law offers only same-sex couples the option to de-
clare their marriage void. Thus, same-sex marriages fall into the same
category as incestuous, bigamous, and underage marriages.146 Declar-
ing the marriage void also forces the couple to officially concede their
relationship was (1) undeserving of legal recognition because void
marriages receive no legal recognition and (2) inherently unequal to
opposite-sex marriage because opposite-sex marriage, in contrast, is
presumed valid.147
VI. IF TEXAS LAW CAN BE INTERPRETED TO ALLOW SAME-SEX
DIVORCE, IT SHOULD
If access to divorce is based on due process rights, and Texas ad-
vances no legitimate interest by prohibiting same-sex divorce, then
section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code is constitutionally suspect to
the extent the law prohibits same-sex divorce. However, section 6.204
does not specifically prohibit courts from granting divorces to same-
sex couples.148 Texas courts, then, are not required to rule on whether
Texas’ mini-DOMA law or section 6.204 are unconstitutional.149 In-
stead, Texas courts can simply apply appropriate statutory construc-
tion principles and interpret section 6.204 as pertaining to marriage
and not to divorce.
A. Statutory Construction
The Fifth Court of Appeals held that Texas courts do not have sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate same-sex divorce petitions based
on interpreting section 6.204 as prohibiting such divorces.150 Because
section 6.204 states that courts may not “give effect to a . . . public act,
record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recognizes, or validates” a
144. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (West 2012).
145. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 63, at 37.
146. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.201–.206 (West 2012).
147. FAM. § 1.101. Christopher S. Krimmer, The Gay Divorce´e: When Same-Sex
“Marriages” Dissolve, 85 WIS. LAW. 28, 31 (2012).
148. FAM. § 6.204(c).
149. Other states’ courts have held similar laws unconstitutional. See, e.g., Kerrigan
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
150. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010,
pet. filed).
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same-sex marriage, the court held that recognizing the underlying
same-sex marriage impermissibly gave effect to the marriage.151 How-
ever, careful statutory construction suggests the court erred in inter-
preting the statute to prohibit adjudicating same-sex divorces.
Statutory construction begins with the language of the statute it-
self.152 The plain language of the Texas Constitution defines marriage
as only a union.153 On its face, the statue does not include a disunion
in the definition of marriage.154 The plain language of section 6.204
also undeniably prohibits same-sex marriages in Texas but does not
plainly prohibit same-sex divorce. Instead, the statute forbids courts
from giving effect to a same-sex marriage.155 A court can grant a di-
vorce without giving effect to the underlying marriage. As both the
Third Court of Appeals and the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowl-
edged, giving effect can mean only on a “going forward basis” and may
be interpreted to allow recognition for the sole purpose of divorce.156
Section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code also forbids courts from giv-
ing effect to any right arising from a same-sex marriage. Divorce is not
a benefit of marriage; divorce is a legal action to dissolve a marriage.
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted the distinction in Christiansen
when the court stated the couple was not “seeking to enforce any right
incident to the status of being married,” but instead was “seeking to
dissolve a legal relationship.”157
Legislative intent is the second-most-important issue in statutory
construction.158 To the degree courts can determine the legislature’s
intent, courts should attempt to effectuate such intent.159 Courts use
legislative history to determine the legislature’s intent.160 Nothing in
the legislative history for Texas Family Code section 6.204 or Texas
Constitution, Article 1, Section 32 suggests the laws were intended to
prevent same-sex couples from divorcing.161 In fact, as stated in Part
151. Id.; FAM. § 6.204(c).
152. Ex parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“The starting
point in analyzing the meaning of a statute is the language of the statute itself.”).
153. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; Appellee Angelique Naylor’s Brief at 17, State v.
Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. filed) (No. 03-10-00237-CV),
2010 WL 4360130, at *17.
154. Appellee Angelique Naylor’s Brief, supra note 153, at 17.
155. FAM. § 6.204(c).
156. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at 442; Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153,
156 (Wyo. 2011); see also Appellee Angelique Naylor’s Brief, supra note 153, at 17;
Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 53, at 12.
157. Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 156; see also Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 53, at 217.
158. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.
1999) (“Legislative intent remains the polestar of statutory construction.”).
159. Stringer v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2000).
160. Id.; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2012).
161. S. Comm. State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 7, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003); Tex.
Legis. Council, Analysis of Proposed Constitutional Amendments 17 (2005), available
at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/Constitutional_Amendments/amendments79_tlc_
2005-11-08.pdf.
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II, the analyses for the laws contained sections stating non-recognition
of same-sex marriage did not infringe on rights of people in same-sex
relationships due to other means of protecting those rights.162 In the
case of divorce, though, there are no other means to protect some of
the rights divorce adjudicates.163 Furthermore, divorces protect the
rights of people in same-sex relationships more consistently.164 Deny-
ing same-sex couples the means to protect their rights by denying
them divorce infringes on their rights and is incongruous with the leg-
islature’s stated intent.
By statute, the Texas Legislature is presumed to have intended a
just and reasonable result.165 A just and reasonable result is further
defined by case law as a result that does not cause great public incon-
venience, unjust discrimination, or inequity.166 Denying same-sex
couples divorce, however, is greatly inconvenient, unjustly discrimina-
tory, and inequitable. Denying divorce is greatly inconvenient because
same-sex couples must either forgo divorce and risk remaining mar-
ried or leave Texas, move to a state that grants same-sex divorce, and
meet that state’s residency requirements. Denying divorce is discrimi-
natory because some couples validly married out-of-state are treated
differently than other couples validly married out-of-state. Denying
divorce creates an unjust result because some citizens are denied ac-
cess to Texas courts—the only avenue of relief available to obtain a
divorce. Lastly, denying divorce creates an unfair result because the
alternative option of declaring marriages void does not adequately
protect the couples’ rights.167
Texas courts are also required to construe statutes so that the stat-
utes are constitutionally sound if it is possible to do so.168 As discussed
above, any interpretation of Texas Family Code Section 6.204 or Texas
Constitution, Article 1, Section 32 rendering them a prohibition of
same-sex divorce is constitutionally suspect.169 Therefore, if it is possi-
ble, Texas courts should not interpret either law to apply to divorce.
162. S. Comm. State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 7, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003)
(“[T]he legislature finds that through the designation of guardians, the appointment
of agents, and the use of private contracts persons may adequately and properly ap-
point guardians and arrange rights relating to hospital visitation, property, and the
entitlement to proceeds of life insurance policies without the existence of any legally
recognized familial relationship between the persons.”).
163. See discussion supra Part V.B.
164. Id.
165. GOV’T § 311.021; Cole v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 563 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978, writ dism’d).
166. Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L. REV.
339, 404 (2012) (quoting C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 322
(Tex. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Battaglia v. Polk, 177 S.W.3d 893, 909 (Tex.
2005); State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 175 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1943)).
167. See discussion supra Part V.B.
168. Blair v. Razis, 926 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) (citing
Brady v. Fourteenth Ct. App., 795 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. 1990)).
169. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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As in the opinions of the trial court in In re Marriage of J.B. and the
Third Court of Appeals in State v. Naylor, it is possible to interpret
Texas Family Code Section 6.204 to apply only to marriage, and other
Texas courts should follow these courts’ example.
B. Granting Same-Sex Divorce Furthers Legitimate Interests of the
State
Rather than detracting from Texas’ legitimate interests, granting
same-sex divorce furthers Texas’ legitimate interests.170 Texas grants
divorces.171 Therefore, Texas has an expressed interest in the legal dis-
solution of marriages. Any reason for Texas’ policy—such as dividing
property or determining child custody—applies equally to legally mar-
ried same-sex couples.
Furthermore, allowing same-sex couples to divorce promotes stabil-
ity and predictability. Texas has a legitimate interest in the certainty of
its citizens’ marital status not only for its citizens’ general well-being
but also for economic stability. As discussed above, only divorce de-
crees provide certainty of dissolution on which creditors can rely.172
Texas also has a legitimate interest in providing its citizens access to
its courts to resolve their legal disputes. Refusing to grant divorces to
same-sex couples precludes them from the only avenue in which they
can obtain relief.173
Texas has a legitimate interest in protecting its laws against constitu-
tional attack. If Texas interprets its current law to preclude divorce for
same-sex couples, Texas invites constitutional challenge on due pro-
cess and equal protection grounds. And Texas would most likely lose.
Denying divorce to a segment of the population violates the due pro-
cess doctrine under Boddie because divorce implicates due process ac-
cess to courts174 and violates the equal protection doctrine under
Romer because it completely denies one group of citizens protection
under the law.175 As the Supreme Court held in Romer, “A law de-
claring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citi-
zens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”176
And the State of Texas should take note. In the State’s appellate brief
to the Texas Supreme Court in In re Marriage of J.B, Texas admitted
170. See Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 53, at 216.
171. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.001–.008 (West 2012).
172. See discussion supra Part V.
173. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
174. Id.
175. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
176. Id. at 633.
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that limiting the “robust protections of divorce” was “precisely the
point” of denying divorce to same-sex couples.177
On a pragmatic note, Texas also has a legitimate interest in promot-
ing administrative convenience in the event Texas decides to recognize
same-sex marriage. The Supreme Court might rule that prohibiting
same-sex marriage is unconstitutional.178 Alternatively, Texas may
choose to recognize same-sex marriage in the future as have other
states.179 In either case, Texas should exercise caution and grant legal
relief when possible in order to prevent potentially complicated legal
situations in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, a decision to refuse to grant same-sex divorces accom-
plishes very little at a potentially high price. To the extent Texas ref-
uses to grant same-sex divorces, Texas most likely violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses by denying some residents equal
access to the courts and resolution to their claims. Texas cannot de-
fend this violation with the same arguments it has used to defend its
ban on same-sex marriage because divorce implicates rights indepen-
dent of marriage. Texas also cannot defend a ban on same-sex divorce
by pointing to the opportunity same-sex couples have to declare their
marriage void because declaring a marriage void is inherently unequal
to issuing a divorce decree. Therefore, Texas exposes itself to constitu-
tional attack if it decides to deny same-sex divorce and in return fur-
thers no legitimate interest yet espoused. Instead, Texas creates
difficulties for other states and for its own citizens.
Whether Texas is ready to embrace an equal right of marriage for
all of its citizens or not, Texas should be ready to embrace the legal
equality of all of its citizens by protecting the right of each to access
Texas courts to adjudicate his or her legal issue.
177. Brief of the State of Texas, supra note 79, at 24. See also Petitioner’s Brief on
the Merits, supra note 63, at 28.
178. The Supreme Court has a history of overturning state-imposed restrictions on
marriage. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
179. Particularly, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Washington, Ver-
mont, and the District of Columbia. Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/is-
sues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated June
26, 2013).
